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Abstract
This paper analyses how ﬁrms’ capital-labour ratio is affected by cash ﬂow, leverage, and
collateral, and how this effect differs at ﬁrms more and less likely to face ﬁnancing constraints
using a rich UK ﬁrm-level data set. It is common in the literature to examine the impact of
ﬁnancial constraints on hiring and ﬁring decisions separately from their impact on decisions
related to investment in physical capital. We argue that as long as ﬁrms use both inputs in
production and there is some substitutability between them, the two decisions need to be jointly
analysed. When we differentiate across ﬁrms that are more or less ﬁnancially constrained, we
ﬁnd that the former group exhibits higher sensitivities of the capital-labour ratio to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics compared to the latter.
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This paper analyses how ﬁrms’ capital-labour ratio is affected by cash ﬂow, leverage, and
collateral, and how this effect differs at ﬁrms more and less likely to face ﬁnancing constraints.
A large number of theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial posi-
tion is important for its ﬁxed investment and employment decisions under imperfect ﬁnancial
markets (see Hubbard (1998) and Bond and Reenen (2006), for surveys). Recent evidence
from the UK, presented by Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) and Guariglia (2008), reveal that
the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed investment choice and credit frictions are indeed interrelated.1 The literature
on ﬁnancial factors and employment decisions is scarce and Benito and Hernando (2008) pro-
vide comprehensive evidence that ﬂexible labour may have more positive consequences for
employment in the presence of ﬁnancial constraints. Overall, empirical studies of ﬁrm invest-
ment and employment strongly suggest that changes in net worth and consequently in ﬁrms’
real decisions (investment, employment) arise from information problems in ﬁnancial markets.
Campello et al. (2008) show that these changes are ampliﬁed during the current credit crisis as
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms in the US plan to reduce, amongst other real decisions, employ-
ment and capital investment in 2009.
The scholarly literature on employment suggests that highly leveraged ﬁrms appear to be
less prone to hoard labour than less leveraged ﬁrms (Sharpe (1994)). In addition, a large num-
ber of empirical ﬁndings document negative effects of leverage and debt service on employ-
ment (Cantor (1990); Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and Benito and Hernando (2008)). On the
other hand, empirical ﬁndings from the ﬁxed investment literature are more controversial and
in particular the issue of whether a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between in-
vestment and cash ﬂow can be seen as an indicator of ﬁnancing constraints. Fazzari et al. (1988)
(henceforth FHP (1988)) use a priori measures of ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnd that the sensi-
tivity of investment to cash ﬂow is particularly large for ﬁrms that have trouble raising external
funds (i.e ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms that face high agency costs). A signiﬁcant challenge
to FHP’s (1988) conclusions came with Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They argue that there
1 Both studies highlight the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial constraints on the ﬁrm’s investment decisions after con-
trolling for investment opportunities and distinguishing between internal and external constraints.
1is no theoretical basis for this relationship and present empirical evidence that less ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms (ﬁrms with a low agency cost) exhibit signiﬁcantly greater investment-cash
ﬂow sensitivities compared to the more constrained ﬁrms.2
Our motivation for modelling the effects of ﬁnancing constraints on the capital-labour ratio
(K/L) stems from simple theoretical considerations. We argue that as long as ﬁrms use both
inputs in production (capital and labour) and there is some substitutability between them, the
two decisions need to be jointly studied. Consider the following example. Under the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale (CRS), suppose that two ﬁrms (ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, which differ
in their ability to raise external ﬁnance) experience a permanent increase in the demand for
their product. Firm 1, which is less likely to be ﬁnancially constrained, operates at full capacity
and expands both inputs by using external ﬁnance and internal funds. With that in our mind
we should expect the ﬁrm-level K/L ratio to remain constant. On the other extreme, ﬁrm 2,
which is more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained, might not be able to borrow the funds for the
capital investment and might satisfy partially the demand by hiring more labour (constrained
ﬁrms by deﬁnition cannot invest optimally in capital, due to the lumpiness and cost of capital).
For the latter ﬁrm we should anticipate a decline in the K/L ratio. A study that considers the
effects of ﬁnancial factors on both investment and hiring decisions would be able to make the
above distinction. In other words, how more and less constrained ﬁrms allocate their funds on
capital and on labour to reach a target K/L ratio when decisions on both inputs have to be taken
simultaneously rather than independently?
Motivated by such issues, this paper presents evidence of a link between the capital-labour
ratio and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics under the presence of capital market imperfections, which
is an issue that has largely been neglected in the literature. A rare point of reference is Gar-
maise (2008), who shows that ﬁnancially restricted ﬁrms will have lower K/L ratios because
informed employees provide more efﬁcient ﬁnancing than uninformed capital suppliers.3 Yet,
2An attempt to shed some light on the debate comes from Tirole (2006) who develops a simple model of credit
rationing and uses it to illustrate the role of net worth. He concludes that unless one has more precise information
about the actual heterogeneity of ﬁrms, it is difﬁcult to predict how the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow varies
with an a priori measure of ﬁnancial constraints. Recent insights on the debate have been offered by Agca and
Mozumbar (2008) and Brown and Petersen (2009) who show a substantial decline in the investment cash ﬂow
sensitivity for physical investment over time.
3 In his paper owner’s characteristics, indices for the bank concentration and rejections of owner’s loan appli-
cations are considered as proxies for ﬁnancial constraints.
2this approach does not tell us how sensitive the K/L ratio is to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, nor
how capital market imperfections can affect ﬁrms’ decisions on the K/L ratio. In examining
diagrammatically a rich ﬁnancial dataset of UK manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 1994-2004
we show that small ﬁrms (more likely to be constrained) face a lower K/L ratio in contrast with
large ﬁrms (less likely to be constrained). Figure 1 illustrates the relevance of ﬁrm-level hetero-
geneity to the understanding of the ﬁrm’s decisions on the capital-labour ratio. We observe that
the K/L ratio evolves differently between ﬁrm classes, with large ﬁrms exhibiting consistently
higher values across years compared to the small group of ﬁrms. In the main part we present
empirical evidence that the ﬁnancial position of ﬁrms drives the heterogeneous responses of the
K/L ratio among different ﬁrm classes.
The value added of the present paper is four-fold. First, we examine the relationship be-
tween the K/L ratio and balance-sheet indicators. Financial status is a vague term for describing
ﬁrms’ net worth and a number of balance sheet indicators have been used in the literature as
measures of ﬁnancial healthiness (see Benito and Hernando (2007) and Guariglia (2008)). We
estimate the responsiveness of the K/L ratio to variations in ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, such
as cash ﬂow, leverage and collateral. Second, the focus of attention is on the impact of cap-
ital market imperfections. Given that a ﬁrm’s choice to use capital and labour may reﬂect its
ﬁnancial position, ﬁnancial factors become a central element. Hence, it is of particular inter-
est to examine the sensitivity of the K/L ratio to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics for more and less
constrained ﬁrms. Third, this study explores the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rates. According
to the theory of the ﬁnancial accelerator (Bernanke et al. (1999)), the interest paid by ﬁrms
with weak balance sheets should react more to monetary policy shocks than the interest paid
by ﬁrms with strong balance sheets. We intend to show how deteriorations in ﬁnancial health
and increases in the cost of ﬁnance, affect the K/L ratio for more and less constrained ﬁrms.4
Finally, a unique feature of this paper is the large panel of ﬁnancial data on UK ﬁrms, extracted
from the FAME database, most of which are unquoted on the stock market. Having access
to ﬁnancial variables for unquoted ﬁrms provides a unique opportunity to test the ﬁnancial
constraints hypothesis.
4Benito and Whitley (2003) and Mojon et al. (2002) have employed a ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate (implicit
interest rate) to analyse the effects of a change in “monetary policy” on ﬁrms’ behaviour.
3The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents our classiﬁcation
schemes and illustrates a preliminary data analysis. In section 3 we present our baseline spec-
iﬁcations and our econometric methodology. In section 4 we discuss the estimation results,
while in section 5 some robustness tests are presented. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data analysis and classiﬁcation schemes
This section presents the sample separation criteria along with a descriptive and graphical
presentation of the data. The data are presented in primarily graphical form to illustrate varia-
tion in the cross-sectional distributions of outcomes and how these have varied over time. This
provides a precursor to the more formal analysis of how the capital-labour ratio, of different
ﬁrm classes, responds to ﬁnancial constraints.
2.1. Sample separation criteria
To depict responses of ﬁrms to capital market imperfections, we ﬁrst have to partition them
according to whether they are more or less likely to face ﬁnancial constraints. There are quite
a number of approaches based on criteria such as size and age (Devereux and Schiantarelli
(1990) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)), bank dependency (Kashyap et al. (1993); Oliner and
Rudebusch (1996) and Guariglia and Mateut (2006)), the dividend payout ratio (Fazzari et al.
(1988)) and collateral ratio (Carpenter and Petersen (2002); Almeida et al. (2004) and Guariglia
and Mateut (2006)). Following the bulk of the literature and the advantageous characteristics
of the data, we create three different measures of ﬁnancial constraints, these are size, age and
bank dependency. The above measures are more likely to capture the degree of asymmetric
information faced by our ﬁrms in capital markets. We use the 75 percent cut-off value5 and we
allow ﬁrms to switch across ﬁrm categories over time.6
Our ﬁrst separation scheme, size, is based on the ﬁrm’s real total assets. Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) use this variable as a proxy for capital market access for ﬁrms in the man-
ufacturing sector. Further, Bougheas et al. (2006), Greenaway et al. (2007) and Guariglia and
5Greenaway et al. (2007) utilise the FAME database and partition ﬁrms to more or less ﬁnancially constrained
using the 75 percent cut-off value.
6 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on ﬁrm-years rather than simply ﬁrms. See Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Guariglia (1999) for a similar approach.
4Mateut (2006) base their group classiﬁcation on the ﬁrm’s real total assets. It is sensible to use
size as a measure of ﬁnancial constraints since small ﬁrms are associated with a higher degree
of information asymmetry, are young and less known and therefore more likely to be vulnerable
to capital market imperfections. Thus, we might expect that the sensitivity of the K/L ratio to
ﬁnancial variables to be higher for small ﬁrms compared to their large counterparts. We gener-
ate a dummy variable, SMALLit, which is equal to 1 if ﬁrm i’s real assets are in the bottom 75
percent of the distribution of the real assets of all ﬁrms operating to the same industry as ﬁrm i
in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Following Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) we employ
age as our second separation scheme. Firms are classiﬁed according to their age in order to
measure the importance of track record. An old established ﬁrm might have higher values of
assets and sales compared to a young and growing ﬁrm, and therefore it is more likely to have
access to the capital market. Hence, young ﬁrms have a higher probability to face problems of
asymmetric information. In our case we should expect young ﬁrms to face a more sensitive K/L
ratio. We create the dummy Y OUNGit, which is equal to 1 if age for ﬁrm i is in the bottom
75 percent of the distribution of the age of all ﬁrms operating to the same industry as ﬁrm i in
year t, and equal to 0 otherwise.
The last scheme is an indicator of the ﬁrm’s bank-dependence, called the mix. It is deﬁned
as the ratio of the ﬁrm’s short-term debt to its total debt and it was introduced by Kashyap et al.
(1993).7 The mix refers to access to market ﬁnance versus bank ﬁnance, where the majority
of short term debt is bank ﬁnance. It attempts to measure the extent to which a ﬁrm has to
ﬁnance itself short term rather than long term and is therefore related to its access to long term
ﬁnance. The higher the mix, the more-bank dependent a ﬁrm is. Thus, it is more likely to be
characterised as a constrained ﬁrm. Following the same reasoning for young and small ﬁrms,
more-bank dependent ﬁrms are expected to exhibit higher sensitivities to their K/L ratio. We
create a dummy BANK DEPit, which is equal to 1 if ﬁrm i’s mix is in the top 75 percent of
the distribution of the mixes of all ﬁrms belonging to the same industry as ﬁrm i in year t, and
7Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) use a closely related variable (short term debt / total short term debt) in their
test for the presence of a bank lending channel of transmission of monetary policy which has subsequently been
used by Guariglia and Mateut (2006).
5equal to 0 otherwise.
2.2. Data description and graphical analysis
We construct our data set from the proﬁt and loss and balance sheet data gathered by Bu-
reau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the FAME database. The FAME database provides
information on 2.8 million companies, 1.9 million of which are in a detailed format, over the
period 1994-2004.8 Although detailed information are available for large ﬁrms, based on ﬁrms
accounting thresholds refereed in the section 248 of the UK Companies Act 1985, small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) do not report detailed accounts. For medium-sized companies
there is no requirement to disclose turnover details, while for small-sized companies only an
abridged balance sheet is required.
In contrast to earlier US and UK studies that employ datasets made up of quoted ﬁrms,
we use a rich ﬁnancial data which comprises mainly non-publicly traded ﬁrms. Our database
includes a majority of ﬁrms which are not traded on the stock market or which are quoted on
alternative exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Off-Exchange
(OFEX) market.9 This is an appealing characteristic of the data as it allows our measures of
capital market imperfections to display a wide degree of variation across observations in our
sample. Having data on private as well as public companies is particularly valuable in our case,
as the private companies are generally the smallest, youngest, and most-bank dependent ﬁrms.
They are therefore more likely than public companies to face ﬁnancial constraints.10
Our sample is limited only to ﬁrms that operate in the manufacturing sector. The decision
to exclude all ﬁrms in service sector was taken for the following reasons:11 The synthesis of
the capital and the capital intensive nature of some of the manufacturing industries make them
8 A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. Our data were downloaded
early in 2005: the coverage period is therefore 1994-2004. It has to be noted that three types of access to the
FAME dataset are available: type C gives access to all ﬁrms in the database; type B gives access to the top 322846
ﬁrms, and type A to the top 139901 ﬁrms. Only the latter access type was available to us for this paper.
9 Unlike in the US, where only quoted ﬁrms are required to ﬁle their quarterly or annual accounts, UK ﬁrms
have to disclose their accounts even if they are not traded on the stock market.
10 Datasets that include only quoted ﬁrms, and therefore relatively large ﬁrms, are likely to be less informative
in determining whether a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained or not. In contrast, our data include a large number of
unquoted ﬁrms, 99.88 percent, and only a small fraction of quoted/publicly traded ﬁrms (0.12 percent).
11 According to the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS), the service sector covers the wholesale and retail
trades, hotels and restaurants, transport and communication, ﬁnancial services, real estate and business activities
and government and other services.
6more suitable for the estimation of the K/L ratio. Further, the inclusion of services in our sample
could bias the results due to the high likelihood of a severe measurement error of ﬁrms’ capital
stock. For ﬁrms operating in sectors like services the composition of capital is more likely to
differ compared to that of ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector because intangible assets might
prevail over the tangible assets.
We provide information on ﬁnancial accounts and ratios for UK manufacturing ﬁrms for
the years 1994-2004. Further, we use the STAN database as our source for data on industry
level, alongside with FAME, to construct the user cost of capital. STAN is maintained by
the Economic Analysis and Statistics Division of OECD’s Directorate for Science, under the
auspices of the Statistical Working Party of OECD’s Committee on Industry and Business
Environment. We extract information on investment and output at the industry level for all
ﬁrms operating in the manufacturing sector.
Our sample includes 17,350 manufacturing ﬁrms and is representative of the aggregate
economy along a number of dimensions. Figure 2 compares the aggregatepercentage change of
the number of employees for the ﬁrms in our panel with the corresponding percentage change
for the OECD entire manufacturing sector. The two series are highly correlated and exhibit
similar variation across time. They both present a sharp fall in 1997 and 2001 which is in line
with ﬁndings in Nickell et al. (2005), who use data up to 2000 for OECD countries and show
that the UK employment follows a decreasing trend between 1995 and 1997. According to the
authors, anumberoflabourmarketinstitutionssuchasemploymentprotectionandemployment
taxes are found to affect negatively the employment rate. Accordingly, the drop in 2001 can be
explained following the same argument.
Figure 3 compares the aggregate percentage change of ﬁrms’ investment in our sample
with the corresponding statistic for all manufacturing ﬁrms in OECD. The two measures paint
a similar picture of the state of investment over time. Clearly evident is the sharp decline in
investment between 1996 to 2000. Investment in our sample bottomed out at a very low level
in 1996 and 2000 and then rose. The OECD investment line reached its lowest level in 2002
and ran-up in 2003. According to the Bank of England (2001) Financial Stability Review the
decline in investment in 1996 and 2000 can be due to a number of factors such as the world
7economic downturn, the aftermath of the dotcom boom of the late 1990s, the decline in UK
ﬁrm proﬁtability that began in 1997 and the exchange rate appreciation.
Next, we impose the restriction that the ﬁrm has at least 3 consecutive time-series obser-
vations per company, with the number of years of observations on each ﬁrm varying between
4 and 11. This produces an unbalanced sample of manufacturing companies. By allowing for
both entry and exit the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates potential selection and
survivor bias. Finally, to control for the potential inﬂuence of outliers, observations in the vari-
ables that have very large dispersion are excluded. Hence, we start our empirical analysis with
14,700 ﬁrms.
The epicenter of this paper is the sensitivity of the K/L ratio to ﬁnancial variables. Thus,
an important element is the discussion of the capital stock and the number of employees which
are used to construct the K/L ratio. Firms’ simultaneous decisions on capital and on labour,
and the substitutability of the two inputs create a motive to consider their evolution across time.
Hence, it is of particular importance to show that any changes in the K/L ratio are not driven
by changes in either capital stock (K) or the number of employees (L). Thus, we depict K and
L variations over our sample period. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, we notice that both capital
and labour follow a similar pattern across time. They both exhibit an increasing trend, although
capital is rising at a higher pace during the mid to late 90’s. Between 1999-2001 we witness
ﬁrst a rise and then a drop in both series, even though it is sharper for the capital stock, which
is in line with the change in investment for the OECD line. The rise in capital can be justiﬁed
by the boom in mergers and acquisitions between 1999 and 2001, the rise in the capital gearing
by historical standards and the interest rate fall in 2000 that lead to the increase in capital (see
Brierley and Bunn (2005)). As for the substantial drop in employment in 1995, this can be due
to a number of labour market institutions mentioned earlier.12 These ﬁgures tell us that both
capital and labour change over time providing therefore justiﬁcation for their joint examination.
We then consider the mean of leverage, collateral, cash ﬂow and interest burden for more
or less constrained ﬁrms using size as sorting device. Leverage, which is deﬁned as the ratio of
ﬁrms’ total liabilities to total assets, is higher for small ﬁrms throughout our sample (Figure 6).
12 These arguments can explain the peak in the K/L ratio in 2000 as shown in Figure 1.
8This implies that high levels of existing debt are associated with worse balance sheet situation,
which would increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and lead to the inability
of ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnance at a reasonable cost. Moving to cash ﬂow (Figure 7), it is
clear that small ﬁrms have a higher cash ﬂow position in contrast to large ﬁrms. This may
indicate that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms feel the pressure to maintain a positive cash ﬂow
cushion under capital market imperfections. The ratio of tangible assets over ﬁrm’s total assets
(collateral ratio) for small and large ﬁrms is presented in Figure 8. We observe that the level of
collateral is consistently higher for large ﬁrms compared to the small ones. It follows that large
ﬁrms can pledge more tangible assets as collateral and therefore might ﬁnd it easier to access
capitalmarkets. Ingeneral, wenoticethatallﬁnancialvariablesfollowadecreasingtrendforall
groups of ﬁrms. One possible explanation for this pattern may be the slowdown in US growth
which in turn affected the ﬁnancial characteristics of UK ﬁrms directly through their activity
in the US and indirectly through lower demand in the UK (Bank of England (2001)). The last
ﬁgure depicts the evolution of interest burden (interest payments over total debt) which remains
reasonably stable over time. Clearly, small ﬁrms have higher interest payment obligations
compared to large ﬁrms which is consistent with the story that more ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms have to pay more to attract external funds.13
A very similar picture emerges by looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 1. Means
and standard deviations of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics are reported for the entire sample
(column 1) and for sub-samples (columns 2-3, 5-6, 8-9). Further, the p-values of a test for
the equality of means are presented in columns 4, 7 and 10. Overall, ﬁrms that are less likely
to be characterised as constrained (large, old, less-bank dependent) have higher values of real
sales, real assets, capital-labour ratio and price. Turning to the ﬁnancial variables we see that
cash ﬂow, leverage and collateral present similarities with the above analysed ﬁgures. More
precisely, small, young and more-bank dependent ﬁrms have higher levels of cash ﬂow, lever-
age and interest payment obligations whereas they are less collateralized. These differences
between more or less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are statistically signiﬁcant in all but two
cases.
13 To check the robustness of the ﬁgures presented above, we partition ﬁrms on the basis of age and bank
dependency. We conclude that similar patterns are observed across different measures of constraints.
93. Methodology
This section describes the empirical approach and presents the baseline models. To examine
the sensitivity of the K/L ratio to ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics we estimate the following static
linear model.
yit = Xit¯ + Fit° + eit (1)
where i = 1, 2,..., N refers to a cross-section of ﬁrms, t = 1, 2,..., T refers to time period.
yit and Xit are the dependent variable and the vector of non ﬁnancial explanatory variables
for the ﬁrm i and year t, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of capital-labour ratio
(K=L), where K is the tangible ﬁxed assets and L is the number of employees.14 The vector of
non ﬁnancial variables consists of PRICE and SALES. The former is the log of real price
- the ratio of industry variable user cost of capital to average ﬁrm wages.15 This variable is
aimed at controlling for changes in the price of factor inputs (capital and labour). We should
expect the K/L ratio to be negatively affected by ﬂuctuations in factor prices. When capital
or labour become more expensive ﬁrms’ decisions on the K/L ratio may be altered. The latter
non ﬁnancial variable is the log of real sales.16 We augment our equation with the ﬁrm’s
sales to control for the potential scale effect i.e. for increasing or decreasing returns to scale.
According to empirical evidence provided by Leung and Yuen (2005), the negative effect of
sales in the short run is to be expected, because adjustment costs associated with labour should
be less than those for capital. A rise in output is achieved initially through the use of more
labour. Thus, it is anticipated a negative relationship between sales and the K/L ratio. eit,
is the error term made up of ﬁve components: Ãi is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component, Ãt is a time-
speciﬁc component accounting for business cycle effects, Ãj is an industry-speciﬁc component
accounting for industry dynamics, Ãjt is an industry speciﬁc component which varies across
time and accounts for industry-speciﬁc shifts across the time period, lastly ²it is an idiosyncratic
14 Following Konings et al. (2003), we use tangible ﬁxed assets as a proxy for capital stock. In section 5 we
test the robustness of our results by replacing tangible assets with the replacement value of capital stock.
15 Although ﬁrm wages are affected by employee skills, we are unable to use this information since the FAME
dataset has only information on the total employee remuneration.
16Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) use a standard labour demand model, supplemented with a ﬁnancial variable
and a control for ﬁrm output namely the log of real sales.
10component.17 We control for Ãi and Ãj by estimating our equations in ﬁrst-differences, for Ãt
by including time dummies, and for Ãjt by including time dummies interacted with industry
dummies in all our speciﬁcations.
The last variable of equation (1), Fit, denotes the vector of ﬁnancial variables for the ﬁrm
i and year t. The set of ﬁnancial variables that we incorporate in our models is in line with
the existing empirical literature. More precisely, we deﬁne COLLATERAL as the ratio of
tangible assets to total assets. An extensive body of the literature points out the importance
of collateral for debt ﬁnance. Firms can raise external ﬁnance by pledging the underlying
productive assets as collateral. Assets that are more tangible, sustain in fact more external
ﬁnancing because tangibility increases the value that can be recaptured by creditors in case of
borrower’s default. If the ﬁrm reneges on its debt, creditors will seize those assets (Carpenter
and Petersen (2002) and Almeida et al. (2004)). We should expect collateral to be a signiﬁcant
indicator for constrained ﬁrms’ K/L ratio.
We also employ LEV ERAGE deﬁned as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, as
a measure of ﬁrms’ indebtness. We aim at producing a comprehensive measure of the over-
all “tightness” of the ﬁrm’s balance sheet (Sharpe (1994); Guariglia (1999) and Vermeulen
(2002)). We might expect that highly leveraged ﬁrms i.e the ﬁnancially vulnerable ﬁrms that
face high agency costs and high levels of capital constraints, to present a more sensitive K/L
ratio.
We include CASHFLOW, deﬁned as the sum of after tax proﬁt and depreciation nor-
malised by the total assets of the company. Recent studies show that the activities of more
constrained ﬁrms depend on the internal funds such as cash ﬂow (Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Guariglia (2008)), and suggest that only ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms should display a propen-
sity to save cash (Almeida et al. (2004)). In this paper, we might expect cash ﬂow to be less
signiﬁcant for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms’ K/L ratio. But on the other extreme, constrained
ﬁrms should be eager to retain cash ﬂow thus, implying its signiﬁcance on ﬁrms’ decisions on
the K/L ratio.
17 Firms are allocated to one of the following nine industrial groups: food, drink and tobacco; textiles, clothing,
leather and footwear; chemicals and man made ﬁbres; other minerals and mineral products; metal and metal
goods; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; mechanical
engineering; and others (Blundell et al. (1992)).
11Finally, interest burden, IB, is incorporated in our model as an indicator for the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc interest rate and is deﬁned as the ratio of interest payment to total debt. Following
previous studies (Benito and Whitley (2003) and Mojon et al. (2002) ) we employ interest
burden to capture the effects of a change in debt-servicing costs on the K/L ratio.
To explore the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ K/L ratio stemming from the interaction between imper-
fect capital markets and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, we employ a set of dummy variables.
yit = Xit¯ + FitDit° + Fit(1 ¡ Dit)± + eit (2)
The dummy vector (Dit) is interacted with the vector of ﬁnancial variables (Fit) in our
baseline speciﬁcation. The dummy vector consists of three different binary variables reﬂecting
size, age and bank dependency.
In this paper we employ the First-Differenced GMM approach (see Arellano and Bond
(1991)) which considers both the endogeneity bias and the unobserved heterogeneity prob-
lems.18 The First-Differenced GMM states the equation in ﬁrst differences to remove unob-
served ﬁrm-speciﬁc and time-invariant industry-speciﬁc effects, while instrumenting the right
hand side variables in the ﬁrst-differenced equations by using the levels of the series involved,
lagged by two or more periods. To test the validity of the additional instruments we use the
GMM test of overidentifying restrictions, or Sargan/Hansen test. The J has an asymptotic chi-
square distribution under the null that these moment conditions are valid. Further, to evaluate
whether the model is correctly speciﬁed we use the m2 test statistic to test the assumption that
there is no second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals.
4. Results
4.1. The nexus between ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and the K/L ratio
A large and growing set of empirical ﬁndings (see Benito and Hernando (2007) and Guar-
iglia (2008)) stress the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc indicators on ﬁxed investment decisions,
inventory investment, and employment. Taking into consideration earlier evidence, we seek to
18 The choice of the First-Differenced GMM over the System-GMM is explained in section 5.
12test whether ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate are important deter-
minants of the K/L ratio for UK ﬁrms.
Results are presented in Table 2. The coefﬁcients on the control variables have the expected
sign. Both PRICE (the ratio of factor prices) and SALES have a negative and highly signiﬁcant
effect on the dependent variable. Increasing price and sales by 1 percent results in 0.760 percent
and 0.635 percent decrease in the capital-labour ratio respectively. When the prices of capital
and labour increase the K/L ratio is affected negatively. Additionally, the negative relationship
between sales and the K/L ratio might be explained by the use of more labour.
Turning to the analysis of the ﬁnancial variables, the results indicate a signiﬁcant effect of
the covariates on the K/L ratio. In particular, the coefﬁcient on CASH FLOW exerts a negative
(-0.301) and signiﬁcant impact on the K/L ratio. An increase in cash ﬂow is associated with a
decrease in the K/L ratio, perhaps due to ﬁrms’ decision to use their internal funds mainly on
employment rather than capital investment. This would be the case if ﬁrms were considered
as relatively more constrained.19 To see whether our ﬁnancial variables have a quantitatively
signiﬁcant effect on the ﬁrm’s K/L ratio we calculate and present their elasticities in Table 2.20
An increase in cash ﬂow causes the K/L ratio to drop with the elasticity at the mean being
0.078- a 10 percent increase in cash ﬂow leads to a 0.78 percent decrease in the K/L ratio. The
coefﬁcient on LEVERAGE is negative (-0.859) suggesting that an increase in ﬁrms’ debt limit
affects negatively the K/L ratio. Firms exhibiting high levels of debt may face problems in
attracting external funds to ﬁnance their projects. The elasticity of the K/L ratio with respect to
leverage, evaluated at sample means, is 0.135. A 10 percent increase in leverage results a 1.35
percent drop in the K/L ratio. Next, COLLATERAL exhibits a positive and highly signiﬁcant
coefﬁcient (2.547) stressing the importance of the ratio of tangible assets to total assets to
support borrowing. A 10 percent increase in collateral is associated with 6.59 percent increase
in the K/L ratio. Finally, the coefﬁcient on interest burden, IB, is negative (-1.920) and highly
19 This result could be attributed to the fact that the majority of ﬁrms included in the dataset are unquoted,
which are more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. We elaborate on the issue of the interaction between cash ﬂow
and constraints in the next section.
20 Elasticities can be calculated in four different forms: i) d(lny)=d(lnx)=¯, ii) d(lny)=d(x)=¯*mean(x), iii)
d(y)=d(x)=¯*mean(x)/mean(y), iv) d(y)=d(lnx)=¯/mean(y). Given that the dependent variable is measured
in log, it is appropriate to calculate elasticities using formula (ii). The coefﬁcients on the ﬁnancial variables (cash
ﬂow, leverage, collateral) and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate are multiplied with their means in order to extract the
elasticities.
13signiﬁcant: interest burden clearly has information about differences in payment obligations
among ﬁrms embedded in it.21 An increase in interest burden causes the K/L ratio to drop with
the elasticity being 0.100.
Our instrument set includes collateral, leverage, cash ﬂow, interest burden, price and sales
all lagged two, three and four times. The J statistic has a signiﬁcance of 0.343 and the m2
statistic shows no sign of second order serial correlation of the residual. Both tests suggest that
the instruments are valid and that there is no sign of mis-speciﬁcation in the model. The results
obtained from this speciﬁcation are of particular importance in shaping the view that ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics such as leverage, collateral and cash ﬂow and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest
rate are important determinants of the K/L ratio.
4.2. Capital market imperfections and the K/L ratio
In this section, motivated by the existing investment and employment literature we consider
the effects of ﬁnancial factors on both investment and hiring decisions by investigating how
more or less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms allocate their funds when decisions on capital and
on labour have to be taken simultaneously. In particular, we examine whether more ﬁnancially
constrainedﬁrmsarelikelytofaceahighersensitivityoftheK/Lratiotoﬁrm-speciﬁcindicators
compared to their less constrained counterparts. Further, our aim is to exploit heterogeneity at
the ﬁrm level in order to consider the ﬁnancial-accelerator hypothesis, that deteriorations in
ﬁnancial health increase the cost of ﬁnance, and hence to show that the K/L ratio of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms is affected more severely.
To examine our main hypotheses we follow the established empirical ﬁnancial constrains
literature and divide ﬁrms to more and less constrained using different classiﬁcation criteria
such as size, age and bank dependency. The results are remarkably consistent across these
categories and document that constrained ﬁrms exhibit greater sensitivities to the K/L ratio.22
Table 3 reports the results from the interaction between ﬁrm type dummies and ﬁnancial vari-
21 A ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimate of the cost of debt (or ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate) has recently been employed by a
number of studies (see Benito and Whitley (2003) and Mojon et al. (2002)). They present evidence that ﬁrms’ real
and ﬁnancial decisions are inﬂuenced through the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate. Their ﬁndings support the notion that
debt-servicing costs affect not only investment expenditures but also employment and inventory spending.
22 We split ﬁrms to more or less ﬁnancially constrained using the 75 percent cut-off value. We explore the
robustness of this ﬁnding in section 5.
14ables as reported in equation (2).
To start with, a key result concerns the impact of CASH FLOW on the K/L ratio. The coef-
ﬁcient on cash ﬂow for small ﬁrms is negative (-0.356) and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
a negative correlation between cash ﬂow and the K/L ratio. Looking at columns (2) and (3)
we see that the coefﬁcients on cash ﬂow for young (-0.363) and more-bank dependent (-0.361)
ﬁrms display similar sign and magnitude compared to small ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm faces difﬁcul-
ties in obtaining external ﬁnance its employment should be more sensitive to the availability
of its internal funds. Constrained ﬁrms can not invest optimally in capital due to some tech-
nological impediment to adjusting capital quickly (this will be the case if capital investment is
lumpy as suggested in the investment literature) thus the ﬁrm will satisfy demand using labour
more intensively.23 This ﬁnding shows that a 10 percent increase in cash ﬂow for small ﬁrms
causes the K/L ratio to drop by 1.01 percent. The analogous ﬁgures for young and more-bank
dependent ﬁrms are 0.98 and 0.94, respectively. For unconstrained ﬁrms the coefﬁcients are
insigniﬁcant and quantitatively unimportant implying that the cash ﬂow-K/L ratio correlation
is zero. Table 3 also reports p-values related with the F-test for the equality of the coefﬁcients
on the interacted terms across the three ﬁrm classes. The results show that the coefﬁcients on
cash ﬂow for more constrained ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly different from the coefﬁcients of less
constrained ﬁrms.
Next, we observe the negative impact of LEVERAGE on the K/L ratio which is signiﬁcant
for constrained ﬁrms. More precisely, focusing on column (1) we see that the coefﬁcient on
leverage is negative (-0.473) for small ﬁrms. Respectively, the coefﬁcients on leverage for
young (-0.598) and more-bank dependent (-0.624) ﬁrms exert a negative impact on the K/L
ratio. This result is consistent with the view that higher levels of debt may deter creditors
from offering further credit for ﬁrms that are vulnerable, meaning a limited access on external
ﬁnance for more constrained ﬁrms. It is a stylised fact that ﬁrms have to raise external ﬁnance
23 Anecdotal evidence in Spaliara (2008) suggests that the sign of cash ﬂow varies with the industry under
consideration. Cash ﬂow has a positive impact on the K/L ratio for the constrained group of ﬁrms operating in
high-tech industries. These are electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other transport
equipment; mechanical engineering. Due to their high technology proﬁle, ﬁrms retain cash ﬂow as a buffer stock
to invest mainly on capital. However, a sign reversal is observed for constrained ﬁrms in low-tech industries i.e
food, drink and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather and footwear; and miscellaneous industries. This result may be
attributed to the labour intensive character of low-tech industries. The majority of ﬁrms in our sample operate in
low-tech industries and this might inﬂuence the negative sign of cash ﬂow observed in Table 3.
15in order to ﬁnance their investment projects. However, when a ﬁrm is highly indebted it’s
extremely difﬁcult and expensive to obtain outside ﬁnance. Thus, the higher the debt burden,
the higher is the cost of external ﬁnance. Cantor (1990) and Calomiris et al. (1994) show
that increases in leverage at the ﬁrm level are associated with increased volatility in capital
expenditures. In other words, ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms with high level of leverage are more
likely to face a more sensitive K/L ratio. The elasticities evaluated at sample means suggest
that a 10 percent rise in leverage is related with 0.90 percent decrease in the K/L ratio for small
ﬁrms. The corresponding ﬁgures for ﬁrms classiﬁed as young and more-bank dependent are
1.12 percent and 1.13 percent. Once again, the elasticities are consistent across ﬁrm classes.
On the other hand, the coefﬁcients on leverage for the less constrained group of ﬁrms appear
to be insigniﬁcant for all three ﬁrm classes. The p-values reveal that in all three cases the
coefﬁcients on leverage for the constrained group of ﬁrms are statistically different from those
of the unconstrained ones.
Turning to COLLATERAL, the estimated coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcant for both
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. Thus, it seems that the importance of collateralized assets
for debt ﬁnance is a critical indicator for ﬁrms’ decisions on their K/L ratio. These results are
in line with Berger and Udell (1990) who show that collateral is an important factor reducing
the riskiness of a loan by giving the ﬁnancial institution a claim on a tangible asset. Contrary to
our expectations the coefﬁcients on collateral are mainly higher for unconstrained ﬁrms. The
elasticities of the K/L ratio to collateral range between 0.635 to 0.716 for constrained ﬁrms,
while they are between 0.860 and 0.947 for unconstrained ﬁrms. However, when we look at
the p-values we observe that they are not signiﬁcantly different from each other suggesting that
the effects of the collateral are the same across different groups of ﬁrms.
Our results, presented in Table 2, thus far imply that interest burden (IB) has a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on the K/L ratio. Although this indicator is not controlled exogenously
by the Bank of England (it is endogenous in the sense that it reﬂects the ﬁnancial conditions of
ﬁrms as well as the interest rate), it does provide evidence about the extent of the asymmetric
information problem in the ﬁnancial transactions given ﬁrm heterogeneity (Bougheas et al.
(2006)). The coefﬁcients associated with the interacted interest burden show evidence that the
16K/L ratio of constrained ﬁrms is more sensitive compared to their unconstrained counterparts.
Speciﬁcally, in columns (1), (2) and (3) the coefﬁcients on interest burden for all groups of
ﬁrms exhibit a negative and precisely determined effect on the K/L ratio. This may be due
to increases in the cost of ﬁnance for the more constrained ﬁrms. This effect is economically
signiﬁcantsincea10percentincreaseininterestburdenisassociatedwith0.92percentdecrease
intheK/Lratioforﬁrmscategorisedassmall. Similarelasticitiesareobservedfortheremaining
two classiﬁcation schemes. As for the F-test for the equality, it shows that the coefﬁcients on
interest burden display signiﬁcant differences in all cases.
The instrument set includes the interaction of collateral, leverage, cash ﬂow and interest
burden with the size, age and bank dependency dummies, and price, sales all lagged two, three
and four times. Overall, the J and m2 tests do not indicate any problems with the speciﬁcation
of the model and the choice of the instruments.
Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd that the K/L ratio presents a higher response to ﬂuctua-
tions in cash ﬂow, leverage and interest burden for ﬁrms that are more likely to face ﬁnancial
constraints. In particular, equation (2) estimates provide us with evidence that ﬁrms facing a
different degree of credit constraints exhibit heterogeneous responses of the K/L ratio. In other
words, more constrained ﬁrms exhibit greater sensitivities of the capital-labour ratio to ﬁnancial
variables.
5. Robustness checks
In this section we provide a series of robustness analysis of our results. Firstly, we examine
whether our results remain persistent when we employ a dynamic estimation. Secondly, we
re-estimate our models replacing our capital stock variable, tangible ﬁxed assets, with the re-
placement value of capital stock. Thirdly, we split our sample using alternative cut-off values
to check the persistence of our results. Finally, to test the robustness of the cash ﬂow results,
we regress the models excluding the distressed ﬁrms.
5.1. Dynamic estimation
The rationale for estimating our models in a dynamic panel data setting, can be attributed to
the time lags that we should expect capital adjustment to be subject to. Given the speed and the
17time of capital and labour adjustment, we estimate our models employing a dynamic approach.
All our variables retain their sign and signiﬁcance in most of the cases while the results
support the validity of the instruments and the absence of second-order serial correlation. In
Table 4 we present the estimated results of equations (1) and (2). The main ﬁndings from
the Dynamic First-Differenced GMM estimations are in line with those reported in section
4.24 It is conﬁrmed that ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics such as leverage, collateral and cash ﬂow
and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate are important determinants of the K/L ratio. Furthermore,
when we make the distinction between more or less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms we show
that the former group of ﬁrms exhibits higher sensitivities of the K/L ratio to cash ﬂow and
leverage. Moreover, the capital-labour ratio is more sensitive to the implicit interest rate for
constrained ﬁrms conﬁrming that ﬁnancial accelerator phenomena play an important role in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy for the UK. The elasticities are presented in Table
8. They suggest that the percentage change of the K/L ratio is somewhat smaller compared
to the changes presented in Table 3. In particular, for the small group of ﬁrms a 10 percent
increase in cash ﬂow and leverage is related with 0.61 percent and 0.62 percent drop in the
K/L ratio. The ﬁgures for the remaining two classiﬁcation schemes, presented in columns
(3) and (4), paint a similar picture. Next, the elasticities of the K/L ratio to collateral range
between 0.492 and 0.652 for constrained ﬁrms, while they are between 0.731 and 0.910 for
their unconstrained counterparts. Finally, a 10 percent rise in the interest burden leads to a 0.6,
0.73 and 0.81 percent drop in the K/L ratio for more constrained ﬁrms. Overall, the p-values of
the F-test on cash ﬂow, leverage and interest burden show signiﬁcant differences among ﬁrm
24 A recently developed model is the System-GMM, an augmented version of First-Differenced GMM outlined
in Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed in Blundell and Bond (1998). The system-GMM controls
for ﬁxed effects with the estimator being an extension of the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) and
estimates equations in levels as well as in ﬁrst-differences. Estimating the levels equations with a lagged difference
term as an instrument offers signiﬁcant gains, countering the bias associated with weak instruments (Blundell and
Bond (1998)). System-GMM performs better than First-Differenced GMM with the latter being seriously biased
in small samples when the instruments are weak. A way to detect whether the First-Differenced GMM estimator
is affected by the ﬁnite sample biases is to compare the estimate of the coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent
variable obtained from the latter estimator with those obtained form the OLS and the WG estimators. As the
OLS estimate is upward biased, whereas the WG estimate is downward biased, one would expect a consistent
estimate of the coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable to lie in between these two estimates. If we ﬁnd that
the estimate obtained using the First-Differenced GMM estimator lies close or below the WG estimated, then the
GMM estimate is downward biased as well (see Bond et al. (2001)). After estimating equation (1) using the OLS,
the WG and the First-Differenced GMM estimators, we ﬁnd that the GMM coefﬁcient lies between the OLS and
the WG estimates. We can conclude that the First-Differenced GMM estimates are unlikely to be subject to serious
ﬁnite sample biases, thus, we opt for estimating the model using the First-Differenced GMM.
18classes but this is not the case for collateral.
5.2. An alternative measure of capital stock
Since part of our analysis depends on the capital-labour ratio, it is important to check
whether our results hinge on how ﬁnely we construct capital. Up to this point we have used
tangible ﬁxed assets as the ﬁrm’s capital stock. Although it is common in the investment liter-
ature (Blundell et al. (1992)) to use the replacement value of capital stock we prefer to employ
it as a measure of robustness rather than our main capital variable for one important consid-
eration. This approach may be problematic in short samples, as it causes a considerable loss
of observations. In fact, when we construct the replacement value of capital stock using the
perpetual inventory formula we loose a substantial number of observations. After re-estimating
equations (1) and (2) we show in Table 5 that results remain largely unchanged, compared with
those obtained using the tangible assets as our preferred capital variable (Tables 2 and 3), and
quantitatively signiﬁcant. The elasticities of the K/L ratio with respect to ﬁnancial variables
are presented in Table 8. Thus, these ﬁndings provide assurance that our main results are not
affected by the deﬁnition of capital.
5.3. Alternative cut-off values
As presented in section 2, due to the synthesis of our data we use a 75 percent cut-off point
to better depict capital market imperfections. To test the robustness of our results we use the
same criteria for splitting our sample between ﬁrms that are more and less likely to face ﬁ-
nancial constraints, but different cut-off values. In particular, to make sure that our results are
not driven from the way that we divide our sample, we employ an alternative benchmark level,
namely 50 percent. Comparing our results in Table 6 with those shown in Table 3 we observe
that our ﬁndings are very similar both quantitatively and qualitatively for all three measures.
We can conclude that the results discussed in section 4 are not biased due to the selection of
cut-off values.
195.4. Positive cash-ﬂow observations and the K/L ratio
OneaimofthepaperistoshowthesensitivityoftheK/Lratiotoﬁrm-speciﬁccharacteristics
i.e cash ﬂow, leverage and collateral. Hence, it is important to verify that the inclusion of the
distressed ﬁrms, as proxied by negative cash ﬂow observations, do not lower the quantitative
signiﬁcant effect of cash ﬂow on the K/L ratio. To examine whether our ﬁndings on cash ﬂow-
K/L ratio relationship are driven by the fact that a ﬁrm is in sufﬁciently bad shape, we follow
Allayannis and Mozumbar’s (2004) technique and we exclude from our sample all the negative
cash ﬂow observations.25
Negative cash ﬂow observations account for 12 percent of the total cash ﬂow observations
and by excluding them we can compare our results across two dimensions: i) the scale of
coefﬁcients and ii) their corresponding elasticities. Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 and
should be compared with those in Tables 2 and 3. The coefﬁcients and elasticities associated
with the cash ﬂow variable are now higher in all cases. The impact of cash ﬂow on the K/L
ratio remains negative and highly signiﬁcant only for the group of constrained ﬁrms as before.
Precisely, the coefﬁcients for small/young/more-bank dependent ﬁrms are now -0.391, -0.397
and -0.430 and the elasticities of the K/L ratio are 0.129, 0.131 and 0.136. This result is in line
with the ﬁnding from Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) and Guariglia (2008) and shows that
the excluded negative cash ﬂow observations have lower K/L-cash ﬂow sensitivities.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we use a large panel of ﬁnancial data on UK ﬁrms, 99.8 percent of which are
not quoted on the stock market, to examine how the K/L ratio should respond to ﬂuctuations
in cash ﬂow, leverage and collateral for ﬁrms that are more or less likely to face ﬁnancial
constraints. Further, we focus on the direct effect of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate on the K/L
ratio for more and less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Using data on unquoted ﬁrms has provided
us with a unique opportunity to construct measures of ﬁnancial constraints displaying a wide
degree of variation across observations.
25 They investigate the role of negative cash ﬂow observations on investment decisions estimating investment
models including positive cash ﬂow observations and all the cash ﬂow observations interchangeably. They ﬁnd
that distressed ﬁrms exhibit lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities than non-distressed ﬁrms.
20This paper is motivated by the fact that relatively little attention has been devoted to the
sensitivity of the K/L ratio to ﬁnancial factors which is somewhat surprising given that changes
in labour demand and ﬁxed investment arise, to some extent, due to information problems in
ﬁnancial markets. We consider the effects of ﬁnancial factors on both investment and hiring
decisions in order to examine how more and less constrained ﬁrms allocate their funds on
capital and on labour when decisions on both inputs have to be taken simultaneously.
The paper has found evidence that ﬁrms’ balance sheet characteristics and the K/L ratio
are interrelated. According to our results, ﬁrms’ capital-labour ratio is affected by cash ﬂow,
leverage, collateral and interest burden. Further, when ﬁrms are classiﬁed on the basis of their
size, age and bank dependency, we show that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms face a greater sensi-
tivity of the capital-labour ratio in contrast to unconstrained ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd evidence that
the K=L ratio is negatively associated with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate, as measured by the
interest burden, and is more sensitive for the constrained group of ﬁrms. Our results are robust
to estimating our empirical models employing a Dynamic First-Differenced GMM approach,
to replacing tangible ﬁxed assets with the replacement value of capital stock, to using alterna-
tive cut-off values and to excluding distressed ﬁrms from our sample. The results suggest that
ﬁnancial factors strongly affect the K/L ratio in the UK manufacturing sector.
Our ﬁndings have important policy implications. A top priority for the UK authorities
should be the promotion of ﬁnancial policies that could spur growth in the economy by relax-
ing ﬁnancial constraints. This is of particular importance for more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms
that face difﬁculties to expand due to the cost of ﬁnance. These policies become even more
relevant during bad economic times since they can help constrained ﬁrms to avoid shortage of
credit, and preserve jobs. Nevertheless, the above policies should be carefully scrutinised as




² Replacement value of capital stock (K): It is constructed using the traditional perpetual inventory method
Blundell et al. (1992). We use tangible ﬁxed assets as the historic value of the capital stock. We assume
that replacement cost and historic cost are the same in the ﬁrst year of data for each ﬁrms. The perpetual
inventory formula is calculated as follows




where ± is the depreciation rate, which we assume to be constant and equal to 5.5% for all ﬁrms, Pt is the
price of investment goods and It is the investment.
² Capital stock (K): Is the tangible ﬁxed assets.
² Employment (L): Is given by the total number of employees.
² Total sales (Sales): Is the log of total company sales.
² Cash ﬂow: Is deﬁned as the sum of after tax proﬁt and depreciation normalized on total assets of the
company.
² Leverage: Is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
² Collateral: Is deﬁned as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets.
² Mix: Is measured as the ratio of the ﬁrm’s short-term debt to its total debt.
² Age: Is deﬁned as the difference between the present year and the ﬁrm’s date of incorporation.
² Size: Is the ﬁrm’s total assets (sum of ﬁxed assets and current assets).
² Average ﬁrm wages (W): Is given by the total employee remuneration divided by the number of employees.
² User cost of capital (UC): Based on the contribution by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), we construct the user














22where j indicates the number of industries in the manufacturing sector and t the time period. PI,j,t and
Pj;t are the industry speciﬁc prices of investment goods and output. ¿ is the highest marginal tax rate on
corporate proﬁts, it is the base rate (we prefer to use the base rate rather than a ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate),
bt are yields on benchmark public sector bonds of around 10 years maturity, ±j is the average depreciation
rate in the particular industry. Dj=Dj + Ej and Ej=Dj + Ej are respectively the average percentage of
debt ﬁnance and equity ﬁnance in the particular industry. (1¡¿)it[Dj=(Dj +Ej)]+bt[Ej=(Dj +Ej)] is
the industry-speciﬁc required rate of return on capital and (1 ¡ ±)[
¢PI;j;t
PI;t ] the capital gain on the fraction
of capital left over after depreciation.
² Price: Is the user cost of capital to average company wage in log.
² Interest burden (IB): Is the ratio of interest payments to total debt.
² Outliers: We trim 0.5 percent of observations both from above and the below to remove the outliers for our
main variables.
7.1.2. Industry-level variables
² Price of investment goods (PI;j;t): Is deﬁned as the gross ﬁxed capital formation.
² Price of output (Pj;t): Is given by the industry- speciﬁc output.
² Deﬂators: The capital stock is deﬂated using the industry speciﬁc price of investment goods. Other vari-
ables are deﬂated using the industry speciﬁc price of output.
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Instruments t-2; t-3; t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using the GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation. The ﬁgures
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummies and
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 4520 and 14125,
respectively. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of the overidentifying
restrictions. Also the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to ﬁnancial indicators are presented. See notes to Table 1.
27Table 3: Capital market imperfections and the K/L ratio
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Priceit -0.498*** -0.514*** -0.671***
(-4.37) (-4.01) (-4.45)
Salesit -0.666*** -0.634*** -0.711***
(-17.63) (-15.62) (-15.99)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit -0.356*** -0.363*** -0.361***
(-5.36) (-5.49) (-5.04)
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.022 0.038 -0.048
(0.54) (1.07) (-0.81)
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit -0.473* -0.598** -0.624*
(-1.77) (-1.97) (-1.89)
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) -0.162 -0.041 -0.304
(-0.53) (-0.09) (-0.54)
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 2.221*** 2.473*** 2.253***
(5.34) (5.90) (5.05)
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 2.851*** 2.796*** 2.522***
(7.22) (5.75) (4.73)
IBit ¤ Constrainedit -1.632*** -1.923*** -1.233***
(-3.46) (-4.06) (-3.09)
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.047 -0.534 -0.720***
(0.09) (-1.33) (-3.67)
Elasticities
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit 0.101 0.098 0.094
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.004 0.008 0.011
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit 0.090 0.112 0.113
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.021 0.006 0.042
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 0.648 0.716 0.635
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.892 0.860 0.947
IBit ¤ Constrainedit 0.092 0.103 0.065
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.001 0.025 0.034
F-test of equality
CashFlowit 0.000 0.000 0.000
Leverageit 0.000 0.000 0.000
Collateralit 0.095 0.528 0.500
IBit 0.003 0.008 0.096
JStatistic 0.139 0.057 0.054
m2 0.183 0.059 0.220
Instruments t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3;
t-4 t-4 t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using the GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation. The ﬁgures
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummies
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Constrained is a dummy variable that represents
SMALLit, Y OUNGit, BANK DEPit. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 4520 and 14125, respectively. m2 is a test for second-
order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions. The elasticities of the
dependent variable with respect to ﬁnancial indicators are presented for each ﬁrm type along with the F-test for the equality of the coefﬁcients.
Also see notes to Table 1.
28Table 4: Robustness: dynamic estimation of capital market imperfections and the K/L ratio
ALL FIRM-YEARS Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(K=L)i(t¡1) 0.162*** 0.136*** 0.149*** -0.014
(7.51) (6.03) (6.38) (-0.83)
Priceit -0.505*** -0.526*** -0.591*** -0.767***
(-3.22) (-4.01) (-4.62) (-7.32)
Salesit -0.579*** -0.685*** -0.612*** -0.872***
(-6.23) (-9.79) (-9.05) (-14.51)
CashFlowit -0.280***
(-3.37)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit -0.212*** -0.290*** -0.339***
(-3.45) (-4.26) (-4.69)




Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit -0.321** -0.326** -0.392
(-2.26) (-2.28) (-1.56)




Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 2.235*** 2.128*** 1.748***
(5.33) (5.19) (3.98)




IBit ¤ Constrainedit -1.063*** -1.349*** -1.535***
(-2.66) (-2.84) (-3.78)
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) -0.244 -0.096 -0.714***
(-0.43) (-0.26) (-4.00)
F-test of equality
CashFlowit 0.002 0.000 0.093
Leverageit 0.000 0.000 0.003
Collateralit 0.079 0.298 0.514
IBit 0.091 0.025 0.018
JStatistic 0.173 0.005 0.198 0.074
m2 0.820 0.571 0.579 0.308
Instruments t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3;
t-4 t-4 t-4 t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using a Dynamic GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation.
The ﬁgures reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time
dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are
3578 and 10223, respectively. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of
the overidentifying restrictions. The F-test is a test statistic for the equality of the coefﬁcients. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 3.
29Table 5: Robustness: an alternative capital variable
ALL FIRM-YEARS Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priceit -0.589*** -0.604*** -0.767*** -0.859***
(-3.64) (-5.01) (-7.31) (-6.58)
Salesit -0.687*** -0.649*** -0.760*** -0.688***
(-7.31) (-10.04) (-19.57) (-10.43)
CashFlowit -0.249**
(-2.48)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit -0.208*** -0.213** -0.261***
(-2.64) (-2.57) (-3.03)




Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit -0.568** -0.657** -0.740***
(-2.51) (-2.34) (-2.63)




Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 2.370*** 1.458*** 1.481***
(6.26) (4.10) (3.24)




IBit ¤ Constrainedit -1.501*** -1.489*** -0.917**
(-3.21) (-3.16) (-2.17)
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.342 -0.139 -0.315*
(0.62) (-0.38) (-1.66)
F-test of equality
CashFlowit 0.002 0.001 0.032
Leverageit 0.000 0.001 0.002
Collateralit 0.911 0.221 0.298
IBit 0.005 0.014 0.092
JStatistic 0.117 0.491 0.201 0.486
m2 0.366 0.127 0.121 0.482
Instruments t-2; t-3 t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3;
t-4 t-4 t-4 t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using a GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation. The ﬁgures
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummies and
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 1576 and 4572,
respectively. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of the overidentifying
restrictions. The F-test is a test statistic for the equality of the coefﬁcients. Also see Notes to Tables 1 and 3.
30Table 6: Robustness: alternative cut-off points
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Priceit -0.567*** -0.396*** -0.558***
(-4.43) (-2.86) (-4.05)
Salesit -0.827*** -0.683*** -0.692***
(-12.3) (-10.2) (-16.0)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit -0.211*** -0.292*** -0.354***
(-3.11) (-3.97) (-4.16)
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.061 -0.017 -0.040
(1.62) (-0.16) (-0.88)
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit -0.299* -0.484* -0.566**
(-1.88) (-1.74) (-2.11)
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.213 -0.114 -0.198
(1.38) (0.27 ) (-0.57)
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 2.175*** 3.103*** 2.415***
(5.39) (9.10) (5.88)
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 3.259*** 2.850*** 2.652***
(8.76) (7.42) (7.29)
IBit ¤ Constrainedit -1.531*** -1.973*** -1.117**
(-3.89) (-3.82) (-2.38)
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) -0.657*** -0.515 -0.629
(-6.07) (-1.30) (-1.46)
F-test of equality
CashFlowit 0.000 0.001 0.000
Leverageit 0.000 0.000 0.000
Collateralit 0.004 0.524 0.414
IBit 0.021 0.007 0.352
JStatistic 0.06 0.083 0.127
m2 0.110 0.084 0.130
Instruments t-2; t-3 t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3;
t-4 t-4 t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using the GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation. The ﬁgures
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummies
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Constrained is a dummy variable that represents
SMALLit, Y OUNGit, BANK DEPit. SMALLit is equal to 1 for ﬁrms in the bottom 50% of their real assets distribution in year t,
and 0, otherwise. Y OUNGit is equal to 1 for ﬁrms in the lower 50% of their age distribution in year t, and 0, otherwise. BANK DEPit
is equal to 1 for ﬁrms in the top 50% of their mix distribution in year t, and 0, otherwise. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 4520
and 14125, respectively. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions. The F-test is a test statistic for the equality of the coefﬁcients. Also see notes to Table 1.
31Table 7: Robustness: positive cash ﬂow observations
ALL FIRM-YEARS Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Priceit -0.751*** -0.630*** -0.652*** -0.731***
(-4.67) (-5.01) (-5.02) (-5.52)
Salesit -0.733*** -0.655*** -0.694*** -0.721***
(-8.23) (-9.52) (-10.3) (-15.4)
CashFlowit -0.344***
(-6.02)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit -0.391*** -0.397*** -0.430***
(-4.80) (-5.47) (-5.32)




Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit -0.489** -0.149 -0.187
(-2.53) (-0.52) (-0.72)




Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 1.844*** 2.592*** 2.592***
(4.91) (6.29) (6.72)




IBit ¤ Constrainedit -0.944** -1.753*** -0.792**
(-2.10) (-3.54) (-2.07)
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.425 -0.001 -0.623***
(0.75) (-0.002) (-3.19)
F-test of equality
CashFlowit 0.004 0.013 0.089
Leverageit 0.000 0.409 0.000
Collateralit 0.015 0.186 0.169
IBit 0.036 0.003 0.621
JStatistic 0.064 0.311 0.04 0.006
m2 0.169 0.200 0.054 0.141
Instruments t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3 t-2; t-3; t-2; t-3;
t-4 t-4 t-4 t-4
Notes: Dependent variable is log(capital/labour). All speciﬁcations were estimated using the GMM ﬁrst-differenced speciﬁcation. The ﬁgures
reported in parentheses are t-statistics in absolute values. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Time dummies
and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in all speciﬁcations. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 4242 and
12260, respectively. Negative cash ﬂow observations were excluded from our sample. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-differenced residuals, and the J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions. The F-test is a test statistic for the equality of the
coefﬁcients. Also see notes to Tables 1 and 3.
32Table 8: Elasticities based on robustness tests
Elasticities based on results in Table 4
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
ALL FIRM-YEARS SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit





CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit 0.061 0.078 0.088
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.002 0.001 0.033
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit 0.062 0.061 0.071
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.009 0.039 0.022
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 0.652 0.616 0.492
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.910 0.828 0.731
IBit ¤ Constrainedit 0.06 0.073 0.081
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.009 0.004 0.034
Elasticities based on results in Table 5
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
ALL FIRM-YEARS SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit





CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit 0.061 0.057 0.068
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.007 0.014 0.009
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit 0.108 0.123 0.134
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.037 0.064 0.073
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 0.692 0.422 0.417
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.754 0.634 0.653
IBit ¤ Constrainedit 0.085 0.08 0.048
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.013 0.006 0.015
Elasticities based on results in Table 6
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit
(1) (2) (3)
CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit 0.064 0.081 0.094
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.013 0.003 0.009
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit 0.064 0.095 0.106
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.029 0.018 0.028
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 0.610 0.881 0.639
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 1.003 0.866 0.998
IBit ¤ Constrainedit 0.094 0.106 0.06
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.028 0.026 0.03
Elasticities based on results in Table 7
Constrained= Constrained= Constrained=
ALL FIRM-YEARS SMALLit YOUNGit BANK DEPit





CashFlowit ¤ Constrainedit 0.129 0.131 0.136
CashFlowit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.033 0.046 0.065
Leverageit ¤ Constrainedit 0.093 0.028 0.034
Leverageit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.011 0.012 0.110
Collateralit ¤ Constrainedit 0.538 0.751 0.730
Collateralit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.858 1.019 0.802
IBit ¤ Constrainedit 0.053 0.094 0.041
IBit ¤ (1 ¡ Constrainedit) 0.016 0.000 0.029
Notes: Elasticities were calculated using the following form: d(lny)=d(x)=¯*mean(x). The coefﬁcients on cash ﬂow, leverage, collateral,
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Figure 9: interest burden for small and large firms
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